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Abstract
In a common agency game, several principals try to in°uence the behavior of an agent.
Common agency games typically have multiple equilibria. One class of equilibria, called
truthful, has been identi¯ed by Bernheim and Whinston and has found widespread use in
the political economy literature.
In this paper we identify another class of equilibria, which we call natural. In a natural
equilibrium, each principal o®ers a strictly positive contribution on at most one alternative.
We show that a natural equilibrium always exists and that its computational complexity is
much smaller than that of a truthful equilibrium. To compare the predictive power of the
two concepts, we run an experiment on a common agency game for which the two equilibria
predict a di®erent equilibrium alternative. The results strongly reject the truthful equilib-
rium. The alternative predicted by the natural equilibrium is chosen in 65% of the matches,
while the one predicted by the truthful equilibrium is chosen in less than 5% of the matches.
Keywords: lobbying, experimental economics, common agency, truthful equilibrium, nat-
ural equilibrium, computational complexity.
1 Introduction
Common agency games model a situation where several principals simultaneously try to
in°uence the behavior of one agent. The agent must choose one alternative among a set
of alternatives. Each of the principals cares about which alternative the agent chooses
and can promise monetary contributions to the agent conditional on the agent's choice.
Namely, each principal can promise a vector of monetary contributions, one for each pos-
sible alternative. Only the contribution on the alternative that is chosen will actually be
paid. The agent observes all the monetary contributions o®ered by the principals and
makes his choice.
Common agency provides a very general way of modeling the process of lobbying
through campaign contributions. The agent is a politician who faces a set of policy alter-
natives. The politician cares both about monetary contributions, which he can spend on
his electoral campaign, and directly about the policy alternative he chooses (either because
he is genuinely concerned or because he wants to please voters). Each principal is a lobby
who represents a special interest. Each lobby can o®er { maybe implicitly { campaign
contributions to the politician conditional on his policy stance.12
For instance, Grossman and Helpman [11] have applied common agency to trade policy.
In an economy with many industries, a politician chooses the level of trade protection (tar-
i® or subsidy) for each industry. Some of the industries are organized as lobbies and some
are not. Through common agency, the authors arrive at a characterization of equilibrium
trade protection in each industry as a function of import penetration, import elasticity, the
preferences of the politician, and whether the industry is organized or not. Applying Gross-
man and Helpman's result, Goldberg and Maggi [9] have used data on trade protection in
the US to estimate the preferences of US politicians.
All the political economy works cited above rely on theoretical foundations developed
by Bernheim and Whinston [3], who were the ¯rst to study common agency. After noting
that the typical common agency game has several equilibria, Bernheim and Whinston
discuss a particular class of equilibria, which they name truthful. A truthful equilibria is
1A partial list of political economy papers that use common agency includes: Grossman and Help-
man [11, 10], Dixit, Grossman, and Helpman [6], Rama and Tabellini [23], and Helpman and Persson [12].
2Note that other models besides common agency are used: e.g. all-pay auctions (See Potters, De Vries,
and Van Winden [21] for experimental work on rent seeking modeled as an all-pay auction). The question
of which model best captures the reality of lobbying is, to our knowledge, untackled and is outside the
scope of the present paper.
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called \truthful" because in it the contribution schedule of each principal follows the shape
of the payo® function of that principal (the exact de¯nition will be given later). Bernheim
and Whinston show several striking properties: (1) A truthful equilibrium always exists
(that is, the set of equilibria of a given common agency game always contains a truthful
equilibrium); (2) An equilibrium is coalition-proof if and only if it is payo®-equivalent to
a truthful equilibrium; and (3) In a truthful equilibrium the agent chooses an alternative
which maximizes the sum of the payo®s of the agent and of the principals.3
In sum, truthful equilibria have several nice properties, which could make them focal.
However, in this paper, we will argue that truthful equilibria also appear to be quite
complex. We will formalize this idea through the theory of computational complexity and
we will prove that the computation time needed to compute the truthful equilibrium of a
generic common agency game increases exponentially with the number of principals. As a
truthful equilibrium is not in dominant strategies, for each single principal the time needed
to compute the optimal strategy is the same as the time needed to compute the whole
equilibrium strategy. This implies that also the computation time for each principal grows
exponentially. Problems with exponentially increasing computation time are considered
hopeless in practice except for very small instances.
If common agency is to be applied to lobbying, computational complexity becomes an
important issue. At the US federal level, thousands of lobbies make campaign contributions
on interrelated issues (see Lehman, Schlozman and Tierney [26]). The fact that the time
needed to compute truthful equilibria is exponential makes them non-computable for all
practical purposes. For instance, it can take up to 35000 years to compute the truthful
equilibrium of a game with 50 principals.4 There are certainly more than 50 lobbies involved
in the trade policy determination studied by Grossman and Helpman [11]).
Given the complexity of the situation, it seems plausible that principals behave in a
3Bergemann and VÄalimÄaki [2] extend Bernheim and Whinston's analysis to a multi-period common
agency game. They de¯ne truthful equilibrium and coalition-proof equilibrium in a dynamic setting and
show that (2) and (3) hold in this setting as well. Although here attention is restricted to one-period
common agency, we conjecture that the gist of our results extends to a multi-period setting.
4The computing time of 35,000 year is obtained under the assumptions that a linear program with one
constraint is solvable in a millisecond and that we use an algorithm for linear programming that is linear
in the number of constraints. Two remarks are in order. First, the existing linear programming algorithms
are worse than linear. Hence, the number 35,000 is by defect. Second, of course, the computation time
does not only depend on the number of principals but also on the number of alternatives. However, as
we shall see, the latter dependence is only linear and therefore has a less important e®ect on computation
time.
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more simple way than predicted by the concept of a truthful equilibrium. Such a simpler
and a-priori plausible behavior is that a principal does not choose a whole contribution
schedule, but rather makes a contribution only to one alternative that she hopes to get.
Such strategies will be called natural, and an equilibrium in such strategies will be called a
natural equilibrium. We show that a natural equilibrium exists (that is, the set of equilibria
of a given common agency game always contains a natural equilibrium).5
Moreover, we show that a natural equilibrium can be computed in polynomial time.
Problems for which computation time grows polynomially are considered to have good
hopes of being solved in practice. Indeed, this is a particularly simple polynomial problem
and, with 50 principals, it takes at most seconds to ¯nd the natural equilibrium.
However, a natural equilibrium does not enjoy the other nice properties of a truthful
equilibrium. It need not be coalition-proof and it need not induce the alternative that
maximizes the sum of the gross payo®s of the agent and the principals. This latter feature
is of great importance for lobbying. If the chosen alternative is e±cient (from the point
of view of the participants to the common agency game), then ine±ciencies arise if some
lobbies are excluded from the lobbying process, or if there are transactions costs, or if some
policy alternatives are exogenously excluded. Hence, with truthful equilibria, the policy
goal would be to make lobbying as accessible and comprehensive as possible. Instead,
with natural equilibria there may be ine±ciencies in the lobbying process in se, even if
everybody is represented and there are no transaction costs.
To establish which class of equilibria is a better predictor of actual play, we turned
to an experiment. For this experiment we designed a simple common agency game with
two principals and three alternatives, denoted by I, II, and III. The payo® functions are
such that the e±cient alternative II gives both principals a positive gross-payo®, whereas
the ine±cient alternatives I and III are desireable only for one of the principals. Fur-
thermore, the natural equilibrium selects alternative I, whereas the truthful equilibrium
selects alternative II.
The main result of the experiment is that alternative I is chosen in 65% of the matches,
while the alternative II is chosen in 3:6% of the matches. This result is a clear-cut rejection
of the hypothesis that subjects play according to the truthful equilibrium.
As we saw above, the alternative selected in the truthful equilibrium is always the
e±cient alternative. This property is used by the political economy literature which apply
5Besley and Coate [4] discuss the relation between truthfulness and e±ciency in the context of lobbying.
They also present the example of a nontruthful equilibrium which induces an ine±cient action. According
to our de¯nition, the nontruthful equilibrium considered by Besley and Coate is a natural equilibrium.
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common agency. Our experimental results suggest that the e±cient alternative need not
arise. This means that the lobbying process may be intrinsically ine±cient and that welfare
results obtained under truthful equilibrium are biased upwards.
We also look at the contribution schedules used by subjects. Compared to the con-
tributions predicted by the truthful equilibrium, our subjects contribute too little on the
`compromise' alternative II and too much on the extreme alternatives I and III. For
each type of principal, the di®erence between the contribution on the extreme alternative
and the contribution on the compromise alternative is so high that it prevents the other
principal from pro¯tably inducing the compromise alternative.
After rejecting the truthful equilibrium, we ask whether instead the natural equilib-
rium is a good predictor of behavior. The answer is less straightforward since players
did not coordinate at any equilibrium at all. We also hardly ever observe the choice of
any contribution schedule that belongs to an equilibrium. However, the observed out of
equilibrium play is consistent with the spirit of the natural contribution schedule. Each
principal focusses on her preferred alternative and bids aggressively on it. The contribution
on alternative II is positive most of the time, but it is only perfunctory in that it cannot
induce alternative II under any reasonable assumption on the other principal's strategy.
In conclusion, our experimental evidence is clearly inconsistent with the truthful equi-
librium and may be consistent with the natural equilibrium. We expect this result to hold
a fortiori in games with more than two principals because the computational complexity of
truthful equilibria increases faster than the computational complexity of natural equilibria.
A methodological contribution of the present work lies in the way we combine game
theory and computational complexity. To our knowledge, this work represents the ¯rst test
of a computational complexity measure as a predictor of behavior in strategic situations.6
We consider two equilibria. One { the truthful { is supported by traditional game-theoretic
re¯nements but has a high computational complexity, while the other is neither coalition-
proof nor e±cient but it is simpler to compute. In the game we consider, experimental
6Note that the sizeable literature on repeated games played by ¯nite automata (such as Abreu and
Rubinstein [1]) is related to strategy implementation complexity rather than computational complexity
and is entirely di®erent from the present work. This point will be made more explicit in Section 2.
Computational complexity has seldom been applied to noncooperative game theory. The only examples we
know of are Gilboa and Zemel [8] and Papadimitriou [18]. Gilboa and Zemel show that correlated equilibria
are simpler to compute than Nash equilibria. Papadimitriou studies the computational complexity of
repeated games. Outside noncooperative game theory, computational complexity has found application
in cooperative games (see for instance Megiddo [17] or Faigle et al [7]) and in general equilibrium (see
Rust [25]). Also, see Rubinstein [24] for a critical survey of bounded rationality models.
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evidence suggests that computational complexity is better than traditional re¯nements at
predicting actual play.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 contains the theory part. After reporting
the main results by Bernheim and Whinston on truthful equilibria, we de¯ne natural
equilibria and prove its properties. We also study the computational complexity of both
truthful equilibria and natural equilibria. Section 3 describes the design of the experiment.
Section 4 reports the results of the experiment with regard to the alternative chosen and
to the contribution schedules used. Section 5 concludes. The Appendix contains the
instructions of the experiment.
2 Theory
2.1 The model
In a common agency game, the players are one agent andm principals. The set of principals
is denoted with M = f1; : : : ;mg. The agent chooses an alternative out of a ¯nite set of
alternatives S. Each principal tries to induce the agent to take a particular alternative
rather than another by o®ering him a monetary payment which we denote as `contribution'.
Let tjs denote the contribution that principal j promises to make to the agent if the agent
chooses alternative s 2 S. The strategy of principal j is a contribution schedule tj, namely
a vector of contributions, one for each alternative in S. Contributions are restricted to be




s. Contributions promised on alternatives other than the chosen alternative are not
paid (this is the di®erence between common agency and an all-pay auction).
The agent cares about how much money he receives and which alternative he chooses.
His payo® is assumed to be separable in money and alternative. Let G0s represent the












Each principal cares about how much money she pays to the agent and which alter-
native the agent chooses. The separability assumption is made for principals too. Let Gjs
denote the utility (gross payo®) principal j derives from s. The net payo® of principal j if
alternative s is chosen is Gjs ¡ tjs.7
7Dixit, Grossman, and Helpman [6] have shown that the main results of Bernheim and Whinston are
still valid if the principals or the agent have nonseparable preferences.
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The game is played in two stages. First, all principals simultaneously and noncoop-
eratively choose their contribution schedules. Second, the agent observes the principals'
contribution schedules and selects an alternative.8
2.2 Truthful Equilibria
Bernheim and Whinston [3] note that a typical common agency game has many equilibria9.
They propose to focus on one type of equilibrium, which they call truthful, and they prove
a number of important properties of truthful equilibria. This subsection reviews Bernheim
and Whinston's results.
De¯nition 1 The contribution schedule tj of principal j 2 M is said to be truthful if it
can be written as tjs = max(0; G
j
s ¡ uj) for all s 2 S, where uj is a constant. A truthful
equilibrium is an equilibrium of the common agency game in which all principals o®er
truthful contribution schedules.
A truthful contribution schedule follows the shape of the payo® function of the principal
plus or minus a constant, except that, when the contribution would be negative, the non-
negativity constraint requires a zero contribution instead. The main feature of a truthful
contribution schedule is that (but for the nonnegativity constraint) a principal who plays
truthful is indi®erent with regards of the alternative that the agent ends up choosing.
The properties of truthful equilibria that are relevant to our analysis can be summarized
as follows:10
Theorem 1 (Bernheim and Whinston) For any common agency game,
(i) For any j 2 M , given ftigi6=j, the set of best responses of principal j contains a
truthful contribution schedule;
(ii) There exists a truthful equilibrium;
8Prat and Rustichini [22] have extended the analysis to common agency games where principals choose
their contribution schedules sequentially. This paper will, however, focus exclusively on the simultaneous
case.
9We will focus on subgame perfect Nash-equilibria, which for simplicity will be referred to as equilibria.
10Theorem 1 is not stated directly in that form in [3]. Part (i) corresponds to Bernheim and Whinston's
Theorem 1. Part (ii) is an immediate consequence of Bernheim and Whinston's Theorem 2. Part (iii) is
Bernheim and Whinston's Theorem 3. Part (iv) is Bernheim and Whinston's Theorem 2.
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(iii) Every truthful equilibria is coalition-proof and every coalition-proof equilibrium is
payo®-equivalent to a truthful equilibrium.







(nj)j2M is the vector of net payo®s for principals if and only if there exists positive

























Part (i) of Theorem 1 says that, given the contribution schedules of the other principals,
a principal can restrict her attention without loss to truthful contribution schedules.
Note that (i) does not imply that a truthful equilibrium actually exists. Bernheim and
Whinston do, however, show the existence of a truthful equilibrium (Part (ii)), that is, they
prove that the set of equilibria of a given common agency game contains an equilibrium
which is truthful.
Part (iii) links truthful equilibria to coalition-proofness. The de¯nition of coalition-
proofness for common agency can be found in Bernheim and Whinston's article. For the
goal of the present paper, an informal de¯nition will su±ce. An equilibrium of a common
agency game is coalition-proof if there exists no coalition of principals that can bene¯t
by agreeing on a \self-enforcing" joint deviation from the equilibrium. The de¯nition of
self-enforcing deviation is recursive. A joint deviation for a given coalition is self-enforcing
if there exists no coalition within the given coalition that can bene¯t from a (self-enforcing)
deviation from the proposed joint deviation. Thus, Part (iii) of Theorem 1 says that there
is an essential equivalence between the set of truthful equilibria and the set of coalition-
proof equilibria. All truthful equilibria satisfy coalition-proofness and an equilibrium which
is not truthful, or payo®-equivalent to a truthful equilibrium, does not satisfy coalition-
proofness.11
11The fact that a truthful equilibrium is coalition-proof among the m principals does not imply that
it is Pareto-e±cient among the m principals if there are more than two principals. Indeed, Konishi, Le
Breton and Weber [14] provide a simple three-principal example of common agency game in which there
exists a non-coalition-proof equilibrium which gives each principal a strictly higher net payo® than every
coalition-proof equilibrium of the same game.
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Part (iv) supplies a complete and very useful characterization of truthful equilibria
(developed by Bernheim and Whinston and investigated in detail by Laussel and Le Bre-
ton [16, 15]). The alternative chosen by the agent maximizes the sum of gross payo®s of
all principals and of the agent. Note that (1) and (2) constitute a maximization problem
in which the unknowns are the equilibrium net payo®s of the m principals.
2.3 Natural Equilibria
This subsection contains the original theoretical contribution of this paper. We introduce
the concept of natural equilibrium and compare it to Bernheim and Whinston's truthful
equilibrium.
As already explained in the Introduction, complexity reasons make it plausible that
players use simpler strategies than those demanded by a truthful equilibrium. This is the
case when a player just picks one alternative and goes only for this alternative, i.e. makes a
serious contribution only to that alternative. We call such a strategy a natural contribution
schedule, and an equilbrium is natural if it is in natural contribution schedules. A way to
formalize this idea is
De¯nition 2 The contribution schedule tj of principal j 2 M is said to be natural if tjs = 0
for all s 2 S except, at most, one. A natural equilibrium is an equilibrium of the common
agency game in which all principals o®er natural contribution schedules.
Notice that a natural equilibrium is an equilibrium of the game. Hence, in a natural
equilibrium each principal has no incentive to use a more complicated strategy than the
equilibrium natural contribution schedule. The next two results are the equivalents for
natural equilibria of Parts (i) and (ii) of Theorem 1 discussed in the subsection on truthful
equilibria.
Proposition 1 For any j 2 M , given ftigi6=j, the set of best responses of principal j
contains a natural contribution schedule.
Proof: Given ftigi6=j , let ~tj denote a best response contribution schedule for j. Let ŝ be
the alternative chosen by the agent. Consider the contribution schedule t̂j such that t̂js = ~t
j
s
if s = ŝ and t̂js = 0 otherwise. As t̂
j leaves j's net payo® unchanged, it belongs to the set
of best responses of j given ftigi6=j .
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Proposition 1 shows that by o®ering a natural contribution schedule a principal is not
worse o® for any combination of contribution schedules of the other principals. Hence,
whatever strategies the other principals choose (natural, or truthful, or all others), each
principal has no incentive to deviate from a natural contribution schedule.
Of course Proposition 1 does not imply that a natural equilibrium actually exists.
However, we will see that one can construct a natural equilibrium as follows. Assume that
S contains at least two alternatives (If S contains only one alternative, all contribution












max(0; Gjs ¡Gjs¤) +G0s ¡G0s¤: (4)
The set Ŝ comprises all the alternatives that are preferred by at least one principal, who
must compensate the agent for changes in G0s. The alternative s
¤ maximizes the sum of
payo®s of principals and agent within the set Ŝ. Alternative ¹s is the alternative to s¤,
within Ŝ, for which a coalition of principals is willing to pay the highest amount, after
compensating the agent for changes in G0s. As we will see, alternative s
¤ is the alternative
that the agent will select in the natural equilibrium.
Principals o®er contribution schedules ft̂jgj2M de¯ned as follows:
(i) If s 6= s¤ and s 6= ¹s, then t̂js = 0 for all j 2 M ;
(ii) For all j 2 M ,
t̂j¹s = max(0; G
j
¹s ¡Gjs¤); (5)
(iii) The vector ft̂js¤g´2M is such that, for all j 2 M ,












Parts (i) and (ii) are clearly feasible, and, by the de¯nitions of s¤ and ¹s, it is possible to
¯nd ftjs¤gj2M which satis¯es Part (iii). Thus, contribution schedules ft̂jgj2M are feasible.
For future reference, denote ¹M = fj 2 M : Gj¹s ¸ Gjs¤g, i.e. ¹M is the set of all principals
who prefer ¹s to s¤. Let M¤ be the complement of ¹M on M .
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The contribution schedules de¯ned in (5), (6), and (7) are natural. All alternatives
receive zero contributions except two: s¤ and ¹s. Principals in ¹M prefer ¹s to s¤ and make
positive o®ers on ¹s. Principals in M¤ want s¤ and o®er just enough to make the agent
indi®erent between the two alternatives.
The following theorem shows that (s¤; ft̂jgj2M) is indeed an equilibrium of the common
ageny game and, therefore, guarantees the existence of a natural equilibrium (that it, the
set of equilibria of a given common agency game contains an equilibrium which is natural):
Theorem 2 Every common agency game has a natural equilibrium.
Proof: We want to show that alternative s¤ and contribution schedules ft̂jgj2M constitute
a natural equilibrium of the common agency game. This will ensure existence of a natural
equilibrium for every common agency game.
We have already argued that ft̂jgj2M are feasible. It is left to prove that neither the





the agent has no incentive to deviate from s¤. Suppose that principal j deviates from t̂j
and plays ~tj instead. Given ~tj, there are four possible cases:
(a) The agent still chooses s¤;
(b) The agent chooses ¹s;
(c) The agent chooses s0, where s0 6= s¤, s0 6= ¹s, and s0 2 Ŝ;
(d) The agent chooses s0, where s0 does not belong to Ŝ.
There are eight exhaustive cases of possible deviations corresponding to the combina-
tions of (a), (b), (c), and (d) with j 2 ¹M and j 2 M¤. For each of the eight cases, we
prove that a deviation is not pro¯table for principal j.
The case in which j 2 ¹M and (a) is obvious. If j 2 ¹M and (b), (5) and (7) imply that
~tj¹s > G
j




















max(0; Gis0 ¡Gis¤) +G0s0 ¸ Gjs0 ¡Gjs¤ +G0s0;
where the strict inequality makes the agent choose s0 over s¤, the ¯rst equality is due to (7),
the second equality comes from (5), the ¯rst weak inequality is implied by the de¯nition of
10
¹s, and the second weak inequality is immediate. Then, ~tjs0 > G
j
s0 ¡ Gjs¤ and the deviation
is not pro¯table for j. If j 2 ¹M and (d), by the de¯nition of Ŝ, there exists an alternative
s00 2 Ŝ such that Gjs00 + G0s00 > Gjs0 + G0s0. Then, principal j increases her net payo® by





s0 ¡ G0s00 . But, alternative s00
belongs to either (a), (b), or (c), and therefore this deviation is not pro¯table.
















max(0; Gis0 ¡Gis¤) +G0s0 ¸ Gjs0 ¡Gjs¤ +G0s0;
where the strict inequality makes the agent choose s0 over ¹s, the equality comes from (5),
and the ¯rst weak inequality is implied by the de¯nition of ¹s. (8) implies
~tjs0 ¸ Gjs0 ¡Gj¹s: (9)






But, by (6), t̂js¤ · Gjs¤ ¡Gj¹s. Then, the deviation is pro¯table only if ~tjs0 < Gjs0 ¡Gj¹s, which
contradicts (9). Finally, the case j 2 M¤ and (d) is analogous to the case in which j 2 ¹M
and (d) and is omitted.
2.4 Computational Complexity
Next, we compare truthful equilibria and natural equilibria from the viewpoint of com-
putational complexity. Natural equilibria have an extremely simple structure because a
principal o®ers zero contributions for all alternatives but at most one. As we will see this
makes natural equilibria for the players much easier to arrive at than truthful equilibria.
To establish this result, we need some basic concepts of computational complexity which
are standard in computer science but may not be familiar to all economists.12 Consider
a class of well-de¯ned mathematical problems. An algorithm for that class of problems is
12See Papadimitriou [19] for an introductory text on computational complexity. Note that the notion
of computational complexity used here is radically di®erent from that used by Abreu and Rubinstein [1]
and other works in the literature on repeated games played by ¯nite automata (See Rubinstein [24] for a
survey and a discussion). In those works, players are bounded in their ability to implement strategies. In
11
a sequence of simple instructions that solve any instance of problem in that class. The
size of a problem within a certain class is the dimension of the data input that de¯nes
the problem (the way to measure the dimension varies from class to class). In general the
number of simple instructions executed by the algorithm is increasing with the size of the
problem. For instance, a class of problems is matrix inversion. The size of the problem is
given by the dimension of the matrix. It takes a higher number of simple instructions to
invert a 3 by 3 matrix than a 2 by 2 matrix.13
The number of simple instructions determines the computation time necessary to ex-
ecute the algorithm. The crucial question asked in computational complexity is: at what
rate does computation time increase as the size of the problem increase? In particular a dis-
tinction is drawn between classes of problems for which computation time is a polynomial
function of size (solvable in polynomial time) and classes problems for which computation
time is a function that increases faster than any polynomial function (this is the case,
for instance, when time grows exponentially). The distinction is of practical importance.
Problems not solvable in polynomial time of large size have little hope of being solved,
even with the fastest computers available.
Let TRUTHFUL denote the problem of ¯nding a truthful equilibrium for a generic
common agency game through maximization problem (1) and (2). Analogously, NATU-
RAL is the problem of ¯nding a natural equilibrium for a generic common agency game
through (3), (4), (5), (6), and (7). Given a common agency game, both TRUTHFUL and
NATURAL have the same input: a matrix of gross payo®s for the m principals and for the
agent. Thus, we will take m to be the size of both TRUTHFUL and NATURAL.14
Theorem 3 (i) NATURAL is solvable in polynomial time; (ii) TRUTHFUL is solvable
in exponential time.
Proof: In linear programming, the size of the input of a problem is proportional to the
a one-stage game such as ours, such a notion would be of little interest. Instead, our players are bounded
in their ability to ¯nd optimal strategies (See also Papadimitriou [18] for discussion on the non-obvious
relation between limits to implementation and limits to computation).
13The computation time refers to a generic instance of the problem. It can therefore be seen as the
upper bound to the computation time. For instance, in the case of matrix inversion, the identity matrix
is very easy to invert, independently of its size, but clearly it is not a generic matrix.
14Clearly, the size of the input of a common agency game also depends on the number of possible
alternatives. However, it is easy to see that this not an important variable from the point of view of
computational complexity because in the algorithm the only operation that is executed across alternatives
is maximization, and maximization is linear in the number of alternatives.
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product of the number of variables with the number of constraints. It can be shown that
linear programming is solvable in polynomial time (see Papadimitriou [20, Theorem 8.5]).
Proof of (i): NATURAL includes two successive steps. First, Ŝ, s¤ and ¹s are found through
(3) and (4). Second, contribution schedules are computed through (5), (6), and (7). The
¯rst step involves an m+2 maximization problem. Its computation time is therefore linear
(and hence polynomial) in m. Regarding the second step, we make the following:
Claim: The problem of ¯nding a contribution matrix satisfying (5), (6), and (7) can be
rewritten as a linear program with at most m variables and at most m constraints.
Proof of the Claim: The equalities in (5) can be substituted into (7), which, in turn,
can be used as the objective function of the problem. The problem of ¯nding a natural















t̂js¤ · Gjs¤ ¡Gj¹s for j 2 M¤:
This is a linear program with ]M¤ variables and ]M¤ + 1 constraints. As ]M¤ · m, the
claim is proven.
By the Claim, the second step of NATURAL is a linear program of size at mostm(m+1).
As linear programming is solvable in polynomial time with respect to the size of its input,
also the second step of NATURAL is solvable in polynomial time and Part (i) is proven.
Proof of (ii): The number of possible coalitions among m principals is 2m. Hence, the
maximization problem in (1) and (2) is a linear program with m variables and 2m con-
straints. Therefore, its size is m2m. As linear programming is solvable in polynomial time
with respect to the size of its input, the maximization problem in (1) and (2) is solvable in
exponential time with respect tom. Hence, TRUTHFUL is solvable in exponential time.
The proof of Theorem 3 relies on the fact that both NATURAL and TRUTHFUL are
linear programs. They have the same number of variables: m. However, the ¯rst has
m + 1 constraints while the second has 2m constraints. The computation time of linear
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programming is known to be polynomial in the number of constraints. Hence, NATURAL
is polynomial, while TRUTHFUL is exponential, and therefore not polynomial.
What we have found in Theorem 3 is the time necessary for a game-theorist to compute
natural and truthful equilibria. Instead, what we are interested in is the time necessary
for a principal to compute her optimal strategy and not the whole equilibrium. However,
as neither truthful nor natural equilibria are in dominant strategies, the problem for one
principal of ¯nding her optimal strategy is equivalent to the problem of ¯nding the whole
equilibrium. A principal cannot know if the strategy she plays is optimal unless she knows
what all other principals are doing. The computation time obtained in Theorem 3 is the
computation time that the individual principals faces.
Theorem 3 does not exclude that there exists an algorithm that ¯nds truthful equilibria
in polynomial time. It only excludes that such an algorithm is based on the characteri-
zation provided in Theorem 1 Part (iv). Therefore, in principle one might ¯nd a simpler
alternative characterization of truthful equilibria which results in a polynomial time algo-
rithm. However, to the best of our knowledge, alternative characterizations are not known
(and the present one seems already quite simple, given the di±culty of the problem).
In this section we compared the properties of truthful equilibria and natural equilibria.
The two classes of equilibria share two properties: existence of best response within the
class, and existence of equilibria. However, there are two important di®erences. One {
coalition-proofness { is in favor of truthful equilibria: a natural equilibrium need not be
coalition-proof. The other property { computational complexity { is in favor of natural
equilibrium: ¯nding truthful equilibria is harder than ¯nding natural equilibria.15
3 Experimental Design
To evaluate the concepts of truthful and natural equilibria we implemented an experimental
design with one agent and two principals, denoted by A and B. The agent had to choose
between three alternatives, denoted by I, II, and III. The agent derived no utility from
any of these alternatives. On the other hand, the principals cared about which alternative
was chosen. Their gross payo®s derived from the alternatives were given by Table 1.
15Natural equilibria and truthful equilibria cannot be distinguished with respect to uniqueness. In





A 17 11 0
B 0 7 12
As described in Section 2, both principals had to choose simultaneously a contribution
schedule in the ¯rst stage of the game. All contributions had to be nonnegative. To exclude
the possibility of losses, the contribution to an alternative had to be not above the gross
payo®s the principal received for that alternative.16
After the choice of the contribution schedules, the agent had to choose an alternative
in the second stage of the game. Principals' net-payo®s were given by their gross payo®
resulting from the chosen alternative minus their contributions to the chosen alternative.
Since the agent had no intrinsic interest in the alternatives, he should choose the al-
ternative with the highest sum of contributions, the winning alternative. This prediction
holds for any combination of contribution schedules of the principals. Truthful equilib-
ria and natural equilibria di®er in the contribution schedules of the principals, not in the
behavior of the agent. Principals' strategy choices are the focus of interest of our experi-
ments, not agent's behavior. Therefore, we substituted the agent by a rule stating that the
winning alternative (i.e. the alternative with the highest sum of contributions) is choosen
automatically.
In case of an equal sum of contributions for two or more alternatives, the tie was broken
by rolling a die with equal probabilities for all winning alternatives (see the instructions
in the appendix for a detailed description of the tie-breaking rule).17 For a continuous
strategy set of the principals this rule would lead to problems with the existence of an
equilibrium. But strictly speaking a continuous strategy set is not available in experiments
anyhow, since payments to the subjects have to be multiples of the smallest coin available,
which was in our experiments 5 (Dutch) cents. Hence, we demanded all contributions to
be multiples of 0.05.18
16Since losses are di±cult to enforce it is common in experimental economics to restrict the strategy set
such that losses are excluded. This only remove some dominated strategies that are not part of neither
the truthful nor the natural equilibrium.
17If the contribution schedules chosen by the principals are part of an equilibrium, theory assumes that
the agent breaks a tie such that the equilibrium is supported. To incorporate such a tie-breaking behavior
into the rule substituting the agent would be very di±cult to explain to the participants. Furthermore,
theory is silent about how ties are broken out of equilibrium.
18Simon and Zame [28] consider a class of in¯nite games which comprise common agency games and
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These changes in the game (substitution of the agent by a rule, probabilistic tie-breaking
rule, ¯nite strategy sets) led to inessential changes in the equilibrium predictions. Speci¯-
cally, the truthful and the natural equilibrium contribution schedules were given by
I II III
A 12 0 0
B 0 0 11:95
Table 2a: The Natural Equilibrium Contribution Schedules
I II III
A 10:95 5 0
B 0 6 10:95
Table 2b: The Truthful Equilibrium Contribution Schedules
with I (in case of the natural equilibrium) and II (in case of the truthful equilibrium)
being the chosen alternatives.19
The equilibrium net payo®s are 5 for A and 0 for B (for the natural equilibrium),
and 6 for A and 1 for B (for the truthful equilibrium). Notice that the main features of
the truthful equilibrium did not change: it is coalition-proof, and it depicts the e±cient
equilibrium.20 The sum of net payo®s for both principals is 40% higher in the truthful
equilibrium than in the natural equilibrium. Furthermore, both equilibria do not rest on
the assumption that in case of a tie the agent makes the right (i.e. equilibrium supporting)
decision - in both equilibria the rule just picks the alternative which would be agent's
unique best choice.
The experiments were conducted in a classroom. In each session 16 subjects partici-
pated. Each subject played the game six times, three times in the role of principal A and
show that in this class the limit of the equilibrium of a discretized game as the discretization becomes
¯ner is an equilibrium of the continuous game. Hence, our discretized game can be taken as a legitimate
approximation of the original game.
19In the experiments we substituted the agent by a rule. Therefore, an alternative was in fact not
chosen by the agent, but rather induced by the contribution schedules of both principals and the rule.
Nonetheless, we refer to that alternative as the 'chosen' or 'winning' alternative.
20In this game the truthful equilibrium is the Pareto-e±cient equilibrium for principals. Thus, we do
not exploit the example of an common agency game in which coalition-proofness does not imply Pareto-
e±ciency (See Footnote 11).
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three times in the role of B.21 Each subject knew beforehand whether she was principal A
or B in a certain round. Since it was common knowledge that each pair consisted of one
principal A and one principal B, everyone also knew whether her partner was principal A
or B. However, nobody knew the identity of her partner.
At the beginning of each session the instructions were read aloud (see Instructions in the
Appendix). Then the subjects had time to privately ask questions, and after that the ¯rst
round started. At the beginning of each round the principals had to choose simultaneously
their contribution schedules by inserting them into their decision form in the line \your
contributions" (see the decision form in the appendix). Then all contribution schedules
were transferred to the experimenters' documentation. After that, we rolled a die. This
was done irrespectively of whether a tie actually occurred or not22. Then we calculated
for each pair of principals which alternative was chosen, and indicated it in the subjects'
decision forms in the line \chosen alternative". We also inserted the contribution schedules
of their partners in the decision form in the line \contributions of your partner". Hence
each subject knew the alternative chosen as well as the strategy of the other principal.
After inserting the chosen alternatives and the partner's contribution schedules into the
subjects' decision forms, the next round started. After the last round, the net payo®s a
subject made in all rounds were summed up and paid to her in cash.
The subjects were matched so that nobody played twice with the same partner. This
was common knowledge. Furthermore, we used a matching protocol that maximized the
number of independent observations in the later rounds under the constraint that nobody
was matched twice with the same partner. Speci¯cally, we applied the following procedure:
In the ¯rst round the 16 subjects formed eight pairs in each session. At the beginning of
the second round, two ¯rst round pairs were merged to form a group consisting of four
subjects. Since this grouping remained the same in rounds 2 and 3 we refer to these
groups as \r2=3-groups". In rounds 2 and 3 each subject was matched with those members
of her r2=3-group with whom he had not been matched in the ¯rst round. This matching
protocol guarantees that every member of a r2=3-group did not experience any (previous or
contemporary) decision of a non-member - any in°uence from a decision of a non-member
on the behavior of a member can be excluded. Therefore, the decisions made within a
21This guaranteed that looking at the whole experiment all subjects were in a similar position. By
that, the impact of distributional concerns (fairness, envy, altruism), which very often shape experimental
results, was minimized.
22This excluded that subjects received any information about whether other pairs experienced ties.
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r2=3-group formed an independent observation
23.
At the beginning of the fourth round, two r2=3-groups were merged into one group of
eight participants. Since this grouping remained the same in rounds 4, 5, and 6 we refer
to these groups as \r4¡6-groups". In rounds 4 to 6 each subject was matched with three
of those members of her r4¡6-group with whom she had not been matched in a previous
round. This matching procedures guarantees that the decisions of every member of a r4¡6-
group were not in°uenced by any (previous or contemporary) decision of a non-member -
the decisions made within a r4¡6-group formed an independent observation.
On the whole we conducted 2 sessions. Therefore, we observed 16 ¯rst round pairs,
eight r2=3-groups, and four r4¡6-groups. The experiments took place at the Center for
Economic Research, Tilburg University, The Netherlands. The participants were students
of di®erent ¯elds, mainly of business administration and law. None of them was a student
of ours and none had knowledge in game theory or common agency theory.
A session lasted about 25 minutes net of going through the instructions. The aver-
age earnings of a participant was 15.12 H°, which was about 8.13 US$ at the time the
experiments were conducted (October 1998). Principal A earned on average 4.26 H° per
round, whereas B earned on average 0.78 H° per round. This brings us to the results of
the experiments which will be discussed in detail in the next section.
4 Results
Truthful and natural equilibrium di®er in two aspects: the alternative chosen and the
strategies which leads to a particular alternative. Hence, we ¯rst examine which alterna-
tives were chosen (Result 1). Then we analyze which contribution schedules were applied
by the principals (Results 2 and 3).
4.1 Chosen alternative
On the whole, we observed 96 choices of alternatives. In 4 times, a tie between 2 alternatives
occured, which was broken by using a die. In what follows we count these cases half for both
23Cooper, De Jong and Ross [5] introduced, and Kamecke [13] analyzed, a di®erent matching proto-
col that preserves the best-reply structure of a one-shot game while maximizing the number of rounds.
However, as also Kamecke [13, p. 411] explains, this does not imply that other, nonstrategic in°uences
between the players (such as learning) are excluded. Hence, such a protocol does not maximise the number
of independent observations, and it is, therefore, not helpful to increase the signi¯cance of statistical tests.
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winning alternatives. In total, we observed 62.5 cases where I was the winning alternative
(65% of all cases), 3.5 cases with II winning (3.6% of all cases), and 30 cases with III
winning (31.4% of all cases). This already indicates:
Result 1
(a) Alternative II was hardly ever chosen.
(b) Alternative I was chosen in most of the cases.
To establish this result, one can use a binomial test on the hypothesis that the winning
probability of II is larger than or equal to 10 %. This hypothesis has to be rejected at a
5% level.24 On the other hand the hypothesis that the winning probability of I is 50% or
less has to be rejected even at a 1% level.
Result 1 can also be inferred from Figure 1 which depicts the evolution of the relative
frequences of the chosen alternatives during the course of the experiments.
Insert Figure 1
In all rounds the frequency of alternative II chosen was less than 10 %, and in 3 rounds
we did not observe any case of II winning. In all rounds, alternative I as well as alternative
III occured more often than II. In the last 2 rounds, however, the gap between II and
III narrowed. On the other hand, alternative I won in more than half of the cases in all
rounds except round 1, and there was no tendency of the frequency of I to decline.
Due to spillovers between partners and due to change of partner from round to round,
the individual observations were of course not independent. Hence, tests based on individ-
ual observations like the binomial tests used above might be not appropriate. To construct
independent observations, recall that we matched subjects such that they formed r2=3-
groups consisting of four persons each whose decisions in round 2 and 3 were independent
of all decisions of all subjects not belonging to the same group. On the whole, we had
8 independent r2=3-groups. For each group we calculated the frequency of the di®erent
alternatives winning.25
24See [27, pp38] for a description of the binomial test.
25Each group made four choices. These four choices together can be summarized by the frequency
distribution over the chosen alternatives. Unlike the individual choices, frequencies of di®erent groups
were independent from each other. Hence, one can test whether the frequency of one altenative di®ers
from that of another alternative.
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r2=3-groups frequency of I frequency of II frequency of III
1 0:5 0 0:5
2 1 0 0
3 1 0 0
4 0:75 0 0:25
5 0:625 0 0:375
6 0:5 0 0:5
7 0:375 0 0:625
8 0:75 0 0:25
Table 3: The Relative Frequencies of the Chosen Alternatives in Rounds 2 and 3
As one can see from Table 3, in ¯ve groups I was chosen more often than III, in two
groups I and III were equally often chosen, and in one group III was chosen more often
than I. In two groups II as well as III never won, and in all other groups I as well as
III were chosen more often than II. Applying a Wilcoxon signed ranks tests26 for the
hypothesis that the frequencies of I and III were equal, we have to reject this hypothesis
at a 5% level (see Table 4).
I versus II I versus III II versus III
p-values 0:047 0:004 0:016
Table 4: Wilcoxon signed rank tests: the p-values for rejecting the hypothesis that the
frequencies of two alternatives in round 2 and 3 are equal.
Using the same test for the hypotheses that the frequencies of I and II, and II and
III, respectively, were equal, we have to reject both hypotheses even at a 2% level. Hence,
in round 2 and 3 we observe I signi¯cantly more often than the other alternatives, and II
signi¯cantly less often than I and III.
In the last 3 rounds we formed two independent r4¡6-groups in each session. In three
of these groups I won in 2/3 or more of all cases, and also in the forth group I was the
most often observed alternative.
26See [27, pp87] for a description of this test.
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r4=6-groups frequency of I frequency of II frequency of III
1 0:79 0 0:21
2 0:83 0 0:17
3 0:67 0:08 0:25
4 0:46 0:13 0:41
Table 5: The Relative Frequencies of the Chosen Alternatives in Rounds 4 to 6.
Using again a Wilcoxon signed ranks test the hypothesis that the frequency of I is equal
to that of II (or III) has to be rejected at a 10% level. The p-value is 6.25%, which is
the lowest possible level one can get with four observations. The same result holds for a
comparison between II and III. Hence, also in the last 3 rounds the 'natural' alternative
I was 'dominating', and the 'truthful' alternative II hardly ever won.
4.2 Contribution Schedules
We now turn to the contribution schedules chosen by the principals. The average con-
tribution of A for I (II) was 9.96 (2.92), whereas B's contribution to II (III) was 3.53
(9.08)27(see Table 6).
I II III
principal A 9:96 2:92 0
principal B 0 3:53 9:08
sum of contributions 9:96 6:45 9:08
Table 6: Average Contribution Schedules
This implies that actual contributions for all alternatives were lower than the contri-
butions of the truthful equilibrium. Compared with the natural equilibrium strategy, A's
(B's) contributions to I (III) were too low, whereas their contributions to II were too high
(compare Table 6 with Tables 2a and 2b). If we look at the development of the average
contributions of the rounds, we ¯nd that A's contribution to I increases, whereas there is
no clear trend for A's contributions to II. B tends to increase her contributions to II as
well as to III (see Figure 2).
Insert Figure 2
27Recall that A's contribution to III as well as B's contribution to I had to be zero.
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This already indicates that we hardly observe equilibrium play in the experiment.
We de¯ne that a contribution schedule is a near equilibrium schedule if the contribution
to any alternative di®ers no more than 5 cents from the actual strategy belonging to
the equilibrium. Given this de¯nition, we found 10 cases (out of 96) where principal A
chose a near equilibrium schedule of the natural equilibrium. We never observed that
A's strategy was a near equilibrium schedule of any other equilibrium. Furthermore, B's
schedule was never a near equilibrium schedule of any equilibrium (natural, truthful, or
any other). Consequently, we never observed that the chosen strategy combinations form
an equlibrium of the game - all observed behavior was out of equilibrium. In most cases the
out of equilibrium play was neither natural nor truthful. We say that a principal chooses
a nearly natural contribution schedule if her contribution schedule di®ers from a natural
contribution schedule by at most 5 cents on each alternative. An analogous de¯nition is
given for nearly truthful contribution schedules. Table 7 shows how often nearly natural
and nearly truthful schedules were chosen.
A - all rounds A - last 3 rounds B - all rounds B - last 3 rounds
natural 24(25%) 17(35%) 14(15%) 6(13%)
truthful 16(17%) 6(13%) 17(18%) 9(19%)
Table 7: Number of Cases of Nearly Natural and Nearly Truthful Contribution Schedules
Chosen by Principal A and B in All and Last 3 Rounds (percentages in parentheses).
This table shows that principal A chooses a nearly natural strategy more often than
a nearly truthful, and this tendency was much stronger in the last 3 periods than in the
beginning of the experiment. B chooses both types of strategies quite rarely, and there
seems to be no change over time.
However, even principal A in the last three periods chooses in most of the cases a strat-
egy that is neither natural nor truthful. Hence, we have to look whether actual schedules
exhibit at least the main characteristics of either truthful or natural strategies. Recall at a
truthful schedule is characterized by the feature that (but for the nonnegativity constraint)
a principal who plays truthful is indi®erent with regard to the chosen alternative. This
implies for the game at hand that A's schedule should make him indi®erent between I and
II 28, whereas B's schedule should make him indi®erent between III and II.29 Hence,
the di®erence between A's contribution to I and II should be 6, wheras B's contribution
28For alternative III the nonnegativity constraint is binding, anyhow.
29For alternative I the nonnegativity constraint is binding, anyhow.
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to III and II should di®er by 5. The actual average di®erences were 7.04 and 5.55. To
see whether these numbers di®er signi¯cantly from 6 and 5, respectively, we use the indi-
vidual schedules to run a t-test for the hypothesis that tAI ¡ tAII = 6 (tBIII ¡ tBII = 5). This
hypothesis has to be rejected at the 1% (5%) level in favor of the counter-hypothesis that
the di®erence is larger than 6 (5). Since the individual observations are not statistically
independent, we also looked at the average schedules of the eight r2=3-groups and the four
r4¡6-groups. We found in 6 of the r2=3-groups and in all r4¡6-groups that t
A
I ¡ tAII > 6 and
tBIII ¡ tBII > 5. This leads to
Result 2 Player A's contribution schedules were not designed to make her indi®erent
between alternative I and alternative II.
Result 3 Player B's contribution schedules were not designed to make her indi®erent
between alternative III and alternative II.
Hence, we can conclude that the actual strategies did not exhibit the main feature of
truthful strategies. Do they exhibit the main feature of natural strategies, namely that
the principals focus on one alternative and bid agressively on it? To answer this question,
we ¯rst investigate the strategies employed by players A. Notice ¯rst that as long as the
di®erence between A's contribution to I and to II was larger than or equal to 7, II could
not win irrespectively of B's contributions. Hence, in these cases A's contribution to II
did not matter.30. For example, whether A chose a schedule like (12,0,0), which was the
natural strategy, or a strategy like (12,4,0) was completely irrelevant for A, since II could
not defeat I in both cases. Hence, if the di®erence between tAI and t
A
II was larger than
or equal to 7, we know for sure that A wanted I to be chosen, and the schedule clearly
quali¯es as an agressive bid on I. As already mentioned, the average di®erence between
A's contribution to I and II was indeed slightly above 7. If we look at the individual
strategies, we observe 38 (out of 96) cases were the di®erence was larger than or equal to
7 (see Table 8). In the last 3 rounds the di®erence was not below 7 in 26 (out of 48) cases.
tAI ¡ tAII > 7 tBIII ¡ tBII > 11
all rounds 38(40%) 19(20%)
last 3 rounds 26(54%) 15(31%)
30Recall that B cannot contribute more than 7 to II, since this is her payo® from II (see Table 1).
Furthermore, we assume B does not contribute 7 to II, since otherwise B's net-payo® would be zero even
if II wins. In fact we never observed that any B (A) chose a schedule such that she would have a zero
net-payo® if II or III (II or I) would have won.
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Table 8: Number of Cases in Which A's Schedule Excludes II (tAI ¡ tAII > 7), and
Number of Cases when B's Schedule Excludes II (tBIII ¡ tBII > 11) (in parentheses are the
percentages of all cases).
When we looked at the four r4¡6-groups, we found that in 3 out of 4 cases the group
average di®erence between A's contribution to I and II was larger than 7. Hence, in the
last rounds in at least half of the cases A's strategies excluded II from winning for sure31.
Up to now the discussion concentrated on whether A's strategy excluded the choice of
II irrespectively of what B contributes. To calculate this, we have to look at B's most
extreme possible contribution to II, namely 7. B's actual contributions, however, were
never that extreme (no case of tBII = 7 was observed), and we can plausibly assume that A's
expectations of what B will do were in°uenced by this experience. Hence, we assume that
A expect B's contribution to II to be at the highest level A previously experienced. Then
we calculate whether for these expectations A's contribution schedule excludes II from
winning32. Notice that this approach is rather unfavorable for I, because it speci¯es the
expectations such that II is most likely to defeat I. Nonetheless, A's actual contribution
schedules jointly with these expectations about B's contributions implied that on average
the sum of contributions for I exceeded the sum of contributions for II by 4.135. This
is a quite substantial di®erence, much larger than A's as well as B's average contribution
for II. Furthermore, for these expectations we ¯nd that in 60 individual cases (out of 64
cases33) A's schedule was such that alternative I would have defeated II. In 2 cases the
sum of contributions would have been equal and only in 2 cases II would have defeated
I. Taking the group average contributions of the eight independent r2=3-groups and the
average of the 4 independent r4¡6-groups, we found that in all cases A's contributions were
such that I would have defeated II.
All this evidence indicates that A's strategy choices can be summarized by
Result 4 Player A's contribution schedules were designed to get alternative I and to ex-
clude alternative II.
Players B had to decide whether they wanted to go for II or III. Their strategy
choices were characterized by
31schedule to II was never observed - A0s strategy never excluded I from being chosen.
32B's contribution to I had to be zero anyhow. Therefore, we do not have to make any assumptions
about A's expectations about B's contribution to I.
33In the ¯rst two rounds, no subject had played the role of A previously. Hence, no subject has previous
experience about B's contributions before the third round.
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Result 5 Player B's contribution schedules were designed to get alternative III and to
exclude alternative II.
Like player B excludes the choice of I whenever the di®erence between the contributions
to III and II was not less than 1134. This happened 19 times, 15 times in the last 3 rounds
(see Table 8). Hence, if we observed quite some cases that B contribited so agressively to
III that I was excluded. This tendency, however, was less pronounced for B than for A.
If we take the highest contribution of A to II as B's expectation about A's behavior, the
average expected sum of contributions for III exceeded that for II by 2.16. Furthermore,
B's schedule was in 53 (out of 64) cases designed such that III would defeat II, and only
in 7 cases II would defeat III; in 4 cases a tie would occur. Taking the group average of
the eight independent r2=3-groups and the group average of the four r4¡6-groups, we found
that in all cases B's contributions were such that III would have defeated II.
The strategies employed by the players resemble neither truthful nor natural strategies.
However, Results 2 and 3 show that players did not choose schedules which made them -
as required by the concept of truthful contributions - indi®erent between the alternatives.
Results 4 and 5 indicate that players A as well as players B rather wanted to enforce
their most preferred alternative which is in line with the spirit of of the concept of natural
contributions. Since players A were in the better position, they succeeded to do so most of
the time. Therefore, the natural alternative was chosen in most cases. If not, player B's
most prefered alternative was chosen, whereas the truthful (and e±cient) alternative was
hardly ever observed.
5 Conclusions
We have introduced a new class of equilibria for common agency games { natural equilibria
{ and we have compared it with the class that is commonly used in the literature { truthful
equilibria. By applying concepts from computational complexity, we show that playing a
truthful equilibrium is computationally much more demanding than playing a natural
equilibrium. Therefore, one is led to conjecture that natural equilibria may be more focal
than truthful equilibria.
This conjecture is partly con¯rmed by an experiment we conducted on a two-principal
common agency game in which the natural equilibrium and the truthful equilibrium pre-
dict di®erent alternatives. We hardly ever observed equilibrium play, neither truthful nor
34B would have excluded III. But this case happened only 2 times.
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natural nor any other equilibrium play. Out of equilibrium contribution schedules, how-
ever, were designed not in the spirit of truthful, but of natural strategies - players made a
serious contribution only on their most prefered alternative. This resulted in the choice of
the natural equilibrium in most of the matches, while the truthful alternative was almost
never selected.
One criticism that can be moved to our experimental evidence is that real-world players,
such as lobbies, have better computing resources than our experimental subjects. However,
in real-world situations, it is also often true that the number of principals is much higher
than two. For instance, in US federal politics the number of lobbies who make campaign
contributions is in the order of thousands. As we have shown, the di±culty of reaching
a truthful equilibrium is increasing at an exponential rate with the number of principals,
and, with few tens of principals, it may already be out of the reach of existing computer
technology. Hence, we strongly suspect that { not only in our experiment, but in many
real-world situations as well { natural equilibrium may be a better predictor of behavior
than truthful equilibrium.
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